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Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process
Pretrial diversion is a formalized procedure authorized by legisla-
tion, court rule, or, most commonly, by informal prosecutorial con-
sent, whereby persons who are accused of certain criminal offenses and
meet preestablished criteria have their prosecution suspended for a
three month to one year period and are placed in a community-based
rehabilitation program. The rehabilitation program may include coun-
seling, training, and job placement. If conditions of the diversion re-
ferral are satisfied, the prosecution may be nolle prossed or the case
dismissed; if not, the accused is returned for normal criminal proc-
essing.'
The goals of pretrial diversion include: (1) unburdening court dock-
ets and conserving judicial resources for more serious cases; (2) reduc-
ing the incidence of offender recidivism by providing an alternative
to incarceration-community-based reha6ilitation-which would be
more effective and less costly than incarceration; and (3) benefiting
society by the training and placement of previously unemployed
persons.2
Pretrial diversion has been described as a "new model of social con-
trol." 3 To ascertain what is novel about this practice, it should be
placed in the context of and distinguished from established discre-
1. The National Pretrial Intervention Service Center in Washington, D.C., lists the
three essential characteristics of pretrial diversion: (1) diversion of the accused out of
the criminal process occurs before formal adjudication of guilt or innocence; (2) ex-
istence of formal eligibility and procedural standards for diversion; and (3) availability
of community-based social and rehabilitative services for the accused immediately after
divelsion. Interview with Arnold Hopkins, Director, September 1973 [hereinafter cited
as Hopkins Interview]. See also NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTIcE
STANDARDS AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS 73 (1973) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS AND GOALS
REPORT, CORRECTIONS].
Two premises underlie the characteristics of community-based rehabilitation. One is
early crisis intervention. It is thought that intervention in the period shortly after
arrest-"the peak moment of contrition and sense of guilt when an offender is most
anxious to make amends and set things right'-is the most propitious time for re-
habilitation. Testimony of Whitney North Seymour, Jr., former United States At-
torney, Southern District of New York, in Hearings on S. 3309 Before the Subcomm.
on National Penitentiaries of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
30 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 3309]. This bill subsequently became
S. 798. See Hearings on S. 798 Before the Subcomm. on National Penitentiaries of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hear.
ings on S. 798). Amended S. 798 passed the Senate on October 3, 1973. See the ac-
companying report, S. REP. No. 417, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
The other premise is that traditional correctional institutions have failed to re-
habilitate and therefore an alternative approach using community resources is needed.
STANDARDS AND GOALS REPORT, CORmEcTIoNs, supra at 74-77.
2. These goals have received general agreement. See, e.g., testimony of K. Mossman,
Chairman of the Criminal Law Section of the American Bar Association, summarizing
the goals of several pretrial diversion programs, in Hearings on S. 798, supra note 1,
at 379.
3. Robertson, Pretrial Diversion of Drug Offenders, 52 B.U. L. RiEv. 335, 337 (1972).
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tionary practices of noncriminal disposition or screening-out of accused
persons before trial.4 Diversion represents a discretionary exercise and
is often used synonymously with discretion.5 Discretion to screen-out
cases at the pretrial stage may be categorized according to whether it
is exercised pursuant to formal or informal standards, and whether or
not a supervised rehabilitation regime exists. 6
The label of diversion may properly be reserved for dispositions pur-
suant to formal standards followed by supervised rehabilitation. Pre-
trial diversion provides, in principle, criteria for decisionmaking, back-
ground information on the accused prior to screening-out, and estab-
lished liaisons with community service agencies. It is an attempt to
standardize ad hoc procedures of an informal discretionary system.7
The practice of noncriminal disposition before trial is not novel, but
its articulation and formalization in diversion are of recent vintage.8
In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice recommended the "early identification and
diversion to other community resources of those offenders in need of
treatment, for whom full criminal disposition does not appear re-
quired."9 Within a year two pioneering pretrial diversion programs,
4. These discretionary practices are of long standing among law enforcement offi-
cials. About one-half of all arrested cases are dismissed at the pretrial stage. PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUsTICE: THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 133 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CRIME COMMISSION REPORT].
See also W. LAFAvE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY (1965);
McIntyre & Lippman, Prosecutors and Early Disposition of Felony Cases, 56 A.B.A.J.
1154 (1970).
5. Some of the reasons for the exercise of discretion to dispose of cases without
trial are not unlike those for diversion. They include the high volume of court cases,
the likelihood of conviction, severity of the sanction in relation to the offense charged,
and availability of rehabilitative services. Kaplan. The Prosecutorial Discretion-A
Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 174 (1965). See F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION
TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME (1970).
6. Informal screening-out without rehabilitation is the most common form of dis-
cretionary action. This includes police discretion and prosecutorial screening-out of
trivial offenses. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 5 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PREsI-
DENT'S CORRECTIONS REPoRTI; Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal
Process, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960).
Informal screening-out with rehabilitation is exemplified by referrals of accused per-
sons suspected of being mentally ill and public drunks to treatment centers. See, e.g.,
VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PROGRAMS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: TEN-YEAR RErORT
1961-1971, at 57 (1972).
Formal screening-out without follow-up social services for certain offenses sometimes
has a statutory basis. For example, some states authorize dismissal of charges in worth-
less check and shoplifting cases when restitution is offered. F. MILLER, supra note 5,
at 272-73. Note, The Merchant, the Shoplifter and the Law, 55 MINN. L. REV. 825 (1971).
7. This reflects current reform proposals to structure and make visible discre-
tionary action in all pretrial activities. See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION
(1971) (Standards 2.5 and 3.8 of the Prosecution Function) [hereinafter cited as PROSE-
CUTION AND DEFENSE STANDARDS]. See also K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 225 (1969);
Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286 (1972).
8. See, e.g., Statement of Sen. Q. Burdick in Hearings on S. 3308, supra note 1, at 1.
9. CRIME COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 134.
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the Manhattan Court Employment Project 0 and Project Crossroads
in Washington, D.C.," were established. 12 They became models for
"second-round" programs in seven cities funded by the United States
Department of Labor in 1971.13 Within the past two years the ideal
of pretrial diversion has been endorsed by public officials,' 4 the Ameri-
can Bar Association,'5 national commissions,' 6 and professional law
organizations. 17 Federal' s and state legislation 9 authorizing pretrial
10. VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE MANHATTAN COURT EMPLOYMENT PRoJEcT: FINAL
REPORT (1972) [hereinafter cited as MANHATrAN PROGRAM REPORT].
11. NATIONAL CoMMITTEE FOR CHILDREN AND YOrH, FINAL REPORT: PROJECT CROSS-
ROADS (1971) [hereinafter cited as PROJECT CROSSROADS REPORT].
12. The Citizens Probation Authority in Genesee County, Michigan, was established
two years before the Manhattan Program and Project Crossroads. See Statement of
Robert F. Leonard, Prosecuting Attorney, Genesee County, in Hearings on S. 798,
supra note 1, at 410 [hereinafter cited as Leonard Statement]. However, because of
the Michigan Program's limited scope and visibility, the later two programs garnered
public attention and became models for new programs.
13. The programs are in Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Cleveland, Minneapolis, San
Antonio, and the California Bay Area (Hayward, San Jose, Santa Rosa). Descriptive
reports on the organization and operations of each of these programs were prepared
in 1971 and 1972 by ABT Associates, Inc., Cambridge, Mass. [hereinafter cited as
ABT Report on Atlanta, Baltimore, etc.]. Statistical information on these programs
is found in ABT Associates, Inc., Pretrial Intervention Program: Second Interim
Progress Report (1972) [hereinafter cited as ABT Progress Report]. Names and ad-
dresses of these seven programs, pius those of 13 others, are listed in the statement
of R. Hughes, Chairman, ABA Commission on Correctional Facilities and Services, in
Hearings on S. 798, supra note 1, at 384-85. Between 1967 and 1972, the United States
Department of Labor spent over $5 million on pretrial diversion. Information on funds
expended by state governments, private foundations, and the Law Enforcement As-
sistance Administration (LEAA) is not available. Hopkins Interview, supra note 1.
14. See address by Associate Justice Rehnquist before the National Conference on
Criminal Justice, sponsored by LEAA, Washington, D.C., January 25, 1973. In an
address to the National Conference on Corrections, former Attorney General John
Mitchell noted that "in many cases society can best be served by diverting the ac-
cused to a voluntary, community oriented correctional program instead of bringing
him to trial." The Minneapolis Star, Dec. 6, 1971, at 13b.
15. See ABA Commission on Correctional Facilities and Services, Coordination Bul-
letin No. 17, June 1973; PROsEcUTION AND DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 7 (Standards
3.8(a) of the Prosecution Function and 6.1(a) of the Defense Function urge each party
to explore the availability of noncriminal disposition, including early diversion into
community-based rehabilitation programs, especially for first offenders).
16. STANDARDS AND GOALS REPORT, CORRErCTIONS, supra note 1, at 95.
17. These include the National District Attorneys Association, the American Cor-
rectional Association, and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency. See State-
inent of R. Hughes, Hearings on S. 798, supra note 1, at 382. The Judicial Con-
ference of the United States supports amended bill S. 798. S. REP. No. 417, supra
note 1, at 11.
18. See Hearings on S. 798, supra note 1, and Hearings on S. 3309, supra note 1.
Z 19. Connecticut is the only state that has a statute authorizing pretrial diversion of
nonaddicts. Conn. Public Act No. 73-641, June 12, 1973. Section 1 states:
There shall be a pre-trial program for accelerated rehabilitation of persons ac-
cused of a crime, not of a serious nature. This act shall not be applicable to
persons accused of a class A, class B, or class C felony. Such program may be
invoked by a state's attorney or prosecuting attorney in his discretion with re-
spect to an accused who, such attorney believes, will probably not offend again
and who has no previous record of conviction of crime. . . .Any such defendant
shall appear in court and shall be released to the custody of the commission on
adult probation for such period, not exceeding two years, and under such condi-
tions as the court shall order. . . If such defendant satisfactorily completes his
period of probation, he may apply for dismissal of the charges against him and
the court, on finding such satisfactory completion, shall dismiss such charges.
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diversion for nonaddict 2° offenders has been introduced and state su-
preme courts have promulgated enabling rules.21 Today, pretrial diver-
sion programs exist or are about to sprout in some 50 metropolitan
areas.
22
As these programs proliferate and mature, basic issues of policy and
law23 surface with respect to the scope, procedures, objectives, and dan-
gers of pretrial diversion, as well as to its role in relation to other
agencies and reforms2 4 of the criminal process. Much of the literature
consists of descriptive reports of particular programs with inadequate
evaluation research. 25 There has been little critical analysis of the kind
The statute was drafted without reference to, and probably in ignorance of, pretrial
diversion programs then operating in New Haven and Hartford. The program staffs
and local criminal justice officials did not know of the existence of the statute until
several months after it was passed. Interview with Daniel Ryan, Executive Director,
New Haven Pretrial Services Council, October 1973.
Similar legislation has been proposed in Massachusetts. See Senate Bill No. 1592, An
Act Establishing a Procedure to Divert Selected Offenders from the District Courts to
Programs of Community Supervision and Service (1970).
20. Federal and state legislation authorizing the diversion of narcotic addict of-
fenders has been in existence for some time. For a survey of these statutes, see Robert-
son, supra note 3, at 337; Note, Addict Diversion: An Alternative Approach for the
Criminal System, 60 GEo. L.J. 667, 677 (1972). All the pretrial diversion programs cited
in note 13 supra deal with nonaddict accused offenders.
21. NEw JERSEY RULES OF CRIMINAL PRAcrICE 3.28 (Defendant's Diversionary Pro-
gram) adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court, October 7, 1970; PENNSYLVANIA RULES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 175-85 (Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition) adopted by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, May 24, 1972. These are the only existing enabling
court rules expressly addressed to pretrial diversion.
22. At the National Conference on Pretrial Intervention held in Atlanta on Sep-
tember 19-21, 1973, there were representatives from about 50 cities which have or are
about to have pretrial diversion programs of some kind. See Nordheimer, Pretrial Di-
version Held Helpful in Cutting Crime, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1973, at 44, col. 1.
23. Pretrial diversion presents, in principle, many legal issues. The National Pretrial
Intervention Service Center is undertaking a comprehensive study of these legal issues.
Hopkins Interview, supra note 1. Preliminary analyses can be found in Skoler, Pro-
tection of Civil Liberties of Pretrial Intervention Clients, address in Symposium on
Therapeutic Intervention Between Arrest and Trial as an Effective Alternative to
Standard Court Processing, American Psychological Association Convention, Montreal,
August 30, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Skoler 1973]; Skoler, Who's in Charge Here:
Legal Issues in Pretrial Diversion, address to Pretrial Diversion Workshop, St. Paul,
Minn., June 27, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Skoler 1972]; State of Michigan Office
of Criminal Justice Programs, Deferred Prosecution and Criminal Justice: A Case Study
of the Genesee County Citizens Probation Authority (1972), reprinted in Hearings on
S. 798, supra note 1, at 486-98; Note, supra note 20.
24. Pretrial diversion is only one of a number of current reform efforts in the
pretrial phase of criminal proceedings. Professor Daniel J. Freed of the Yale Law
School has distinguished two categories of pretrial reforms: person reforms, which deal
with the person of the accused such as pretrial release, bail, and diversion; and pro-
cedural reforms, which deal with the procedures for handling a criminal case, such
as the restructuring of plea bargaining, speedy trial, and reorganization of the prose-
cution and defense functions. D. Freed, Pretrial Project Prospectus, 1973 (unpub-
lished paper). For an overview of pretrial "person reforms," see Note, Administration
of Pretrial Release and Detention: A Proposal for Unification, 83 YALE L.J. 153 (1973).
25. See, e.g., the ABT Reports on the "second-round" programs, supra note 13;
Metropolitan Dade County, Pretrial Intervention Project: 18-Month Report (1973); Hud-
son County Pretrial Intervention Project & Vocational Service Center, Program and
Procedures (1973); State of Michigan Office of Criminal Justice Programs, Deferred
Prosecution and Criminal Justice: A Case Study of the Genesee County Citizens Pro-
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that is required prior to the permanent funding and institutionalization
of these programs. 26
This Note deals with pretrial diversion of nonaddict, adult accused
offenders. 27 It describes four aspects of pretrial diversion-the -diverted
population, the "intake" decision, social intervention, and the termina-
tion decision-and discusses accompanying issues of law, policy, and
evaluation research. 28 Two main questions are raised: (1) Are current
pretrial diversion programs effective in achieving their stated goals?
bation Authority (1972), reprinted in Hearings on S. 798, supra note 1, at 440-517.
See also NATIONAL PRETRIAL INTERVENTION SERVICE CENTER, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE HAND-
BOOK ON PRETRIAL INTERVENTION TECHNIQUES AND ACTION PROGRAMS (1973); NATIONAL
DIsRICr ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, MANUAL ON PRETRIAL SCREENING AND DIVERSIONARY PRO-
GRAMS (1972). Existing studies of pretrial diversion are primarily descriptive rather
than analytical. See Brakel & South, Diversion from the Criminal Process in the
Rural Community, 7 AM. CRIM. LAW Q. 122 (1969); Carter, The Diversion of Of-
fenders, 36 FED. PROB. 31 (1972); Harlow, Diversion from the Criminal Justice System,
2 CRIME & DELINQ. LIT. 136 (1970).
26. Pretrial diversion has been described as a "practice in search of a theory."
Vorenberg & Vorenberg, Early Diversion from the Criminal justice System, 1972 (un-
published paper, Harvard Law School). An expanded version has appeared in PRISONERS
IN A IERICA 151 (L. Ohlin ed. 1973). Citations in this Note are to the original un-
published paper. Other analytical and occasionally skeptical commentaries are found
in NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUsTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS
32-41 (1973) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS AND GOALS REPORT, COURTS]; STANDARDS AND
GOALS REPORT, CORRECTIONS, supra note 1, at 73-97; Newman, Corrections of the Future:
Some Paradoxes in Development, in COLLECTED PAPERS: CONFERENCE ON CORRECTIONS IN
CONTEXT 3 (D. Baker ed. 1972); D. Freed, E. De Grazia, & W. Loh, The New Haven
Pretrial Diversion Program: A Preliminary Evaluation, June 1973 (unpublished report
to the New Haven Pretrial Services Council; copy on file in Yale Law School Library)
[hereinafter cited as Freed]; S. Messinger, The Year 2000 and the Problem of Criminal
Justice, address to the Conference on Criminal justice in Chicago, June 24, 1973 (un-
published paper, School of Criminology, University of California, Berkeley); R. Nimmer,
Alternatives to Prosecution: Diversion from the Criminal Justice Process, 1973 (un-
published paper, American Bar Foundation, Chicago).
27. This Note thus is confined to pretrial diversion of accused adults without prob-
lems of drug abuse (see note 20 supra), alcoholism (see R. NIMMER, Two MILLION
UNNECESSARY ARRESTS (1971); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: DRUNKENNESS (1967)), or mental illness
(see E. De Grazia, Report on Pretrial Diversion of Accused Offenders to Community
Mental Health Treatment Programs in Washington, D.C., 1971 (unpublished report
to National Institutes of Health)). Juvenile diversion is also excluded. For a con-
sideration of some of the issues in juvenile diversion projects, see AMERICAN CORREC-
TIONAL ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE DIVERSION: A PERSPECTIVE (1972); R. LEMERT, INSTEAD OF
COURT: DIVERSION IN JUVENILE JUSTICE (1971); NATIONAL INSTnUTE OF LAw ENFORCEMENT
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, NEW APPROACHES TO DIVERSION AND TREATMENT OF JUVENILE
OFFENDERS (1973).
28. The data for this Note were drawn from program reports, supra notes 13 and
25; observations of the New Haven, Manhattan, and Crossroads programs; and per-
sonal interviews conducted between January and September 1973.
The description of program procedures relies to a great extent on personal ob-
servations rather than the programs' own published accounts. A program's own pub-
lished accounts often reflect a designer's ideal conception of how a program should
operate instead of how it in fact operates under everyday pressures.
To avoid repeated documentation of the same references, the sources for the fol-
lowing materials will not be footnoted again: Statistical data on the Manhattan, Cross-
roads, and New Haven programs are drawn from the evaluation reports, supra notes
10, 11, and 25, respectively. Description of procedures of the "second-round' programs
come from the ABT reports, supra note 13, and statistical data from the ABT Progress
Report. supra note 13, based on a survey of 1,866 participants processed by the seven
programs as of fall 1972.
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(2) What kinds of controls, based on legal and policy considerations, ex-
ist or should be built into operational procedures to safeguard basic
rights of program participants against potential abuses of discretion




All programs have formal eligibility criteria established either by
the prosecutor if the program was initiated by and is under the aus-
pices of his office, or by the program staff in agreement with the prose-
cutor if the program is administratively independent. An accused who
fails to meet any one of the following criteria may be disqualified:
Residency. The accused must be a resident of the city or county in
which the program operates.
Age. There is usually a minimum age requirement of 16 or 17 years
and there may also be an upper age limit of 25 to 45 years.29
Charge. This criterion varies from program to program.30 In general,
new programs begin cautiously, limiting admission to those charged
with misdemeanors. As they mature and gain the confidence of crim-
inal justice officials, the criteria are expanded to cover nonviolent
felonies.31 Motor vehicle law violators, narcotics addicts, and prostitutes
are normally excluded.
Prior arrests. Some programs admit only accused first offenders; 32
29. Some age requirements are: in Project Crossroads and the Boston program, 16
to 26 years: in Manhattan, 16 to 45 years; in New Haven, 16 years with no upper
limit; in Baltimore, 16 to 18 years. Program participants are generally young; the
median age in the Manhattan program is 19. Most participants in all programs are
under 25.
30. Project Crossroads admits only those accused of one of 12 specific misdemeanor
offenses. Interview with James Davis, Director of Project Crossroads, May 1973. On
the other hand, the New Haven program has an open-ended rule allowing admission
of a person charged with any offense up to and including a class D felony. New Haven
Pretrial Services Council, Diversion Program Eligibility Criteria, 1972. See Conn. Public
Act No. 73-641, June 12. 1973.
31. Project De Novo in Minneapolis began by accepting only accused misdemeanants
but now also accepts a limited number of accused felons. In the first three years of
the Manhattan program, 65 percent of the participants were charged with misde-
meanors, 30 percent with felonies, and 5 percent with violations. The use of mis-
demeanor-felony labels may be misleading because there is no uniform classification of
offenses. Thus, though the Atlanta program admits a large number of accused felons,
most of them are accused of possession of marihuana, an offense which in other juris-
dictions may constitute only a misdemeanor.
Property offenses are the most frequent charges. In the "second round" programs, 50
percent were accused of larceny and theft; 10 percent with automobile theft; 10 percent
with misconduct; and 10 percent with drunkenness or marihuana possession.
32. Project Crossroads is one example.
832
Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process
others will admit persons with a record of one prior misdemeanor
conviction; 33 and still others require only that the accused be a "non-
habitual offender. ' 34 Programs usually begin with accused first of-
fenders and gradually broaden their eligibility standards to encompass
those with prior records. 35
Unemployment. Since the Department of Labor which funded the
early programs emphasized a manpower approach to rehabilitation,
subsequent programs also adopted under- or unemployment as a con-
dition for eligibility. However, this requirement is not consistently
enforced. 36
Guilty plea. A controversial condition for eligibility for pretrial
diversion is the requirement of a plea of guilty37 or an acknowledg-
ment of "moral responsibility" for the charged offense. 38 Admission
of guilt is said to be necessary for successful rehabilitation and for the
protection of the prosecutor's case.3 9 From a therapeutic viewpoint,
33. The San Antonio and Boston programs permit one prior misdemeanor convic-
tion. However, about 70 percent of the participants in the San Antonio program and
42 percent in the Boston program have no prior adult record.
34. See Leonard Statement, supra note 12. The New Haven program allows "one
previous felony or three previous misdemeanor convictions during the past five years."
See note 30 supra.
35. This develops over time as programs earn the confidence of local prosecutors.
Also, first offender statutes in some jurisdictions obviate the need for pretrial di-
version of such individuals. In California, first offender misdemeanor charges are ex-
punged upon completion of summary probation. Consequently, "judges are inclined to
feel that with this option available, many individuals do not require the services of
an intervention program." ABT Report on Project Intercept (California Bay Area
programs), supra note 13, at 1-14. Nonetheless, 42 percent of California program par-
ticipants were accused first offenders. New York has "adjournment in contemplation
of dismissal" whereby prosecution of accused first offenders on marihuana possession
or violation charges is deferred for a certain period, and if no additional offenses
are committed during this time, the initial charges are dismissed. As a result, the
Manhattan program no longer diverts persons accused of violations. Interview with
Ennis Olgiatti, Director, Manhattan program, April 1973.
S. 3309 would exclude from eligibility those accused of a crime of violence or con-
victed of a prior offense punishable by more than one year imprisonment. Hearings
on S. 3309, supra note 1, at 5. Following widespread criticism of these restrictive cri-
teria in the hearings on S. 3309, S. 798 was amended to abolish all requirements as
to charge and prior arrests. In fact, it now provides no standards whatsoever regarding
eligibility for pretrial diversion. The government attorney is authorized but not re-
quired to divert, and he has sole discretion to determine which accused persons are
"eligible." Hearings on S. 798, supra note 1, § 3(1).
36. In the "second round" programs, about one-fifth to one-half of the participants
were fully employed during the year preceding arrest and pretrial diversion.
37. See Skoler 1972, supra note 23, at 14.
38. See Hearings on S. 798, supra note 1, at 497 (Citizens Probation Authority
(CPA) program). Amended S. 798 apparently adopted the CPA program prccedure of
requiring an "informal acknowledgment of personal responsibility" instead of a formal
guilty plea. This "meets the needs of rehabilitation without raising the possibility of
unnecessary delays inherent in the formal pleading procedure." S. REP. No. 417, supra
note 1, at 14.
39. This is the position of the Department of justice. See letter of R. Erickson in
Hearings on S. 3309, supra note 1, at 139, and testimony of M. McKevitt in Hearings
on S. 798, supra note 1, at 397.
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repentance may be necessary for rehabilitation. 40 But the premise of
criminal justice is that guilt is established after trial. The purpose of
diversion before trial is precisely to spare certain accused individuals
the burden of criminal processing, including the necessity to enter a
plea. Indeed, when an accused is in custody and unrepresented by coun-
sel, any plea spurred by the promise of pretrial diversion is arguably
coerced and invalid, not because the promise is improper, but because
the accused under those circumstances is too susceptible to induce-
ment.41
As a practical matter, even if pretrial diversion does not imply a
legal finding of guilt,42 it "implicitly assumes guilt. '43 Program staff
consider it inhibitory to counseling to maintain a presumption of inno-
cence that both parties know is questionable. In fact, most participants
"freely and without being asked admit to their participation in the
alleged offense. ' 44 As a precondition for pretrial diversion, it has been
recommended that "the facts of the case establish that the defendant
committed the alleged act."415
B. Eligibility and Prosecutability
Inflexible and restrictive eligibility provisions may undermine pro-
gram effectiveness. 46 Although the varying needs, resources, and atti-
tudes of criminal justice agencies in different localities make it im-
practical to construct detailed model eligibility criteria, it may be use-
ful to propose an approach to guide the formulation of those criteria.
In most jurisdictions, prosecutability is determined informally.
About one-half of all arrests are disposed of outside the criminal
process.4 7 Some charges are dismissed, some nolle prossed, and some
40. Citizens Probation Authority sees it as a "psychological necessity" and "essen-
tial to the 'reality therapy" approach used for reforming anti-social conduct." Hearings
on S. 798, supra note 1, at 505 nn.163-64. Others are not convinced that confession
is a prerequisite to rehabilitation. See testimony of K. Mossman, id. at 390.
41. "But with the inducement of a lighter sentence dangled before him, the sin-
cerity of any cries of mea culpa becomes questionable." Scott v. United States, 419
F.2d 264, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
42. See p. 842 infra.
43. Nimmer, supra note 26, at 1. In fact, one researcher found an implicit as-
sumption of guilt underlying all practices in a metropolitan criminal court. A. BLUl-
BERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1967).
44. Hearings on S. 798, supra note 1, at 505 n.164 (Citizens Probation Authority
program).
45. STANDARDS AND GOALS REPORT, CORRECTIONS, supra note 1, at 96 (Standard 3.1(3)(g)).
46. An example in point is the Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act which, due to
severe eligibility criteria, proved to be virtually useless in the diversion of addict de-
fendants. Testimony of former United States Attorney W. N. Seymour, Jr., in Hearings
on S. 3309, supra note 1, at 31.
47. CRiumE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 133.
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reduced in exchange for a plea of guilty. The reasons for these actions
include the nature of the offense, the weight of the evidence, the per-
sonal characteristics of the arrestee, and the amount of resources avail-
able to the prosecutor. These variables, taken together, can be differ-
entially weighted and entered into an equation producing an index
of prosecutability. 4s The accused can be placed on a continuum or
scale ranging from low to high priority of prosecution. This scale
could then be divided into three categories of prosecutability, though
the locations of the dividing lines may vary in different jurisdictions:
(1) those at the lower end would be screened-out at the pretrial stage;
(2) those in the intermediate section would be diverted before trial;
and (3) those at the upper end would have top prosecution priority.
Existing eligibility criteria normally state only the upper limit of
the second section (e.g., misdemeanor charge and no more than one
prior conviction); the lower limit is left undefined. Consequently there
is the risk that those who should be screened-out are funneled into
pretrial diversion.
Failure to define clear boundaries at both ends of the pretrial diver-
sion eligibility section has endangered realization of one of diversion's
stated goals-efficient use of resources in the criminal justice process.
One of the often stated advantages of pretrial diversion is the reduction
of court docket congestion.40 This goal seems more ideal than real.
Pretrial diversion saves court time only if, in its absence, the accused
would go to trial. But most pretrial diversion cases, given the non-
serious nature of the charges, would have been disposed of by negotia-
tion and plea rather than trial on the merits.0
The caseload burden on the system is not significantly reduced so
48. A prosecutability score is currently computed for every accused individual ap-
pearing in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. A social psychological scale
has been adopted that measures severity of the charged offense which, combined with
data on an accused's past record and other background factors, yields a composite
score that determines priority of prosecution. However, this scale is used only for de-
termining prosecution priority, not pretrial diversion eligibility. Interview with Charles
Work, chief assistant United States Attorney, District of Columbia, April 1973.
49. See note 2 supra.
50. The only available data that support this observation come from a preliminary
study, based on a small sample, by Freed, supra note 26, at 76. However, interviews
with prosecutors (note 120 infra), public defenders (note 77 infra), and judges (notes
68-69 infra) in different jurisdictions indicated that only infrequently would an ac-
cused, charged with an offense and possessing a record similar to that of the ordinary
progam participant, go to trial. No available data support the contrary view. Indeed,
pretrial diversion may take the same or more time than ordinary disposition by ne-
gotiation and plea. The prosecutor and court still retain responsibility for both the
initial diversion decision and final disposition. The accused must still appear in open
court at those times and for interim continuance motions. See note 56 infra. If there
is an unfavorable termination, there must be rearraignment and the negotiations must
begin anew.
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long as programs divert a minimal fraction of all arrested cases.51
Increasing the numbers diverted relieves the burden but may also
strain program resources and reduce program effectiveness. 502
II. Intake Decision
The decision to divert an accused person results from an interplay
of discretionary decisions by the program and different agencies of
the criminal process. To appraise this aspect of a pretrial diversion
program, it is necessary to look at the relationships among and the per-
ceptions of the program staff and local criminal justice officials, prin-
cipally prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel.
A. Program staff
A common procedure of pretrial diversion programs not affiliated
with the prosecutor's office is staff inspection of the daily arrest lists
at the police detention center and selection, on the basis of the avail-
able information on record, of those who satisfy prima facie the eligi-
bility criteria. 3 These persons are then personally interviewed by the
program screener. 4
Diversion programs use one of two types of screening procedures. In
the one-stage screening procedure, such as that used in New Haven,
51. In New Haven, for example, less than two percent of all arrested persons are
diverted. Freed, supra note 26, at 63. Amended S. 798 envisions pretrial diversion of
2,000 persons per year out of a federal district court caseload of 44,000 per year, or
about 5 percent. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 1, at 9.
52. A distinctive advantage of pretrial diversion programs at present is the ample
funding that permits low counselor-participant caseload ratios. See note 122 infra. A
substantial increase in intake without a corresponding increase in program resources
may result in the situation that most probation departments and juvenile court staffs
are now facing: overburdened caseloads and low staff morale.
53. Not all eligible persons are in fact screened for pretrial diversion. For ex-
ample, the Manhattan program does not operate on weekends, so persons arrested at
that time have no opportunity to be diverted. The New Haven program estimates
that one-half of the city's arrested population is not screened because program staff
are not on duty weekdays during court session hours or on weekends. Freed, supra
note 26. at 28.
54. The purpose of the detention interview, according to the New Haven pro-
gram's written procedures which are patterned after those of the Manhattan program,
is to explain to the accused the nature of the program; the right to counsel before
making a decision whether to accept pretrial diversion if granted; the absence of a
presumption of guilt or innocence; and the lack of any guarantee of dismissal of
charges upon successful program completion. New Haven Pretrial Services Council,
Diversion Program Statement to Participants, 1972. In practice, interviews take place
in a crowded, noisy detention cell, last only a few minutes, and essentially give the
screener an opportunity to "size-up" the accused rather than discuss the foregoing
four points. Most accused persons, for their part, are simply anxious to get out of
detention. Interviews with New Haven program participants indicated that many had
no real understanding of what pretrial diversion was about at the time they agreed
to participate.
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the program screener recommends to the prosecutor pretrial diversion
for the accused immediately after the detention interview.55 If granted,
a continuance is requested from the court, and the accused is released
to the care of the program. In the two-stage procedure, the screener
seeks an interim one or two week continuance in order to enable the
program to conduct further interviews and investigations of the candi-
date before rendering an admission decision.56
The diversion decision is significantly affected by the type of screen-
ing procedure. Under the one-stage procedure the decision is usually
made under harried circumstances: the accused decides on the spot
without full comprehension of the program; the prosecutor consents
or rejects with only minimal time to examine the accused's case; de-
fense counsel is left out of the decisionmaking; the screener is unable
to discuss the case with other program staff so there is no internal
check or review of his decision.5 7 The two-stage process provides addi-
tional time to minimize these risks.
B. Prosecutors
The key figure in pretrial diversion is the prosecutor. His influence
over intake and disposition largely determines the character and ef-
fectiveness of a program.
Since a prosecutor is considered to have almost unfettered discretion
55. In principle, a careful joint evaluation by prosecutor and screener of the needs
of the accused and the circumstances of the charge is contemplated. In reality, the
prosecutor barely has time to peruse the arresting officer's report and usually has
to decide on the spot whether or not to grant pretrial diversion. Seriousness of the
alleged offense and prior record, not rehabilitative potential, are the determinants of
his decision. Freed, supra note 26, at 27.
56. This is the procedure used in the Manhattan program. The two-stage pro-
cedure used in Project Crossroads is different in two important respects. In Cross-
roads, during the one week interim continuance, it is the prosecutor, not the pro-
gram staff, who makes the investigation of the accused's background. The party with
this information has an advantage in the ensuing negotiations. Also, after the interim
continuance, the Crossroads procedure provides for an informal conference among prose-
cutor, defense counsel, and the accused. This hearing procedure ensures participation
by defense counsel in the diversion decision. In Manhattan, after the program has
investigated the accused further, the screener approaches the prosecutor to negotiate
for pretrial diversion. Defense counsel plays no role in the diversion decision.
57. Interviews with screeners of the New Haven and Manhattan programs reveal
that, within the scope of the eligibility criteria, there is still room for considerable
individual discretion. One screener, for example, may pay attention to an accused's
"attitude"; if it is negative, the accused is disqualified even though all eligibility
criteria are satisfied. Another screener who is "street-wise" may rely on knowledge of
facts about an accused not revealed in the record in deciding whether or not to
recommend admission. Because differences in discretionary judgments are inevitable, it
is necessary to build controls into the screening process to guard against arbitrariness.
Some controls may be attained by requiring screeners to record the reasons for re-
jecting a candidate after the detention interview or interim continuance investigation,
with review of that decision by a program staff supervisor.
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to prosecute, 58 it is widely assumed that he has almost unfettered dis-
cretion to divert as an incidence of that power. Any suggestion of lim-
iting that discretion is denounced by prosecutors as an improper sub-
version of their traditional authority. 59
Programs initiated by and affiliated with the prosecutor's office are
naturally under his control. Community-based programs, administra-
tively independent of any criminal justice agency, often are equally
58. Discretion whether or not to prosecute is rooted in English common law. The At-
torney General of England had unfettered power to decide whether to prosecute in
criminal cases, subject only to the control of the 'High Court of Parliament when
there was an abuse of discretion. Regina v. Allen, 121 Eng. Rep. 929 (Q.B. 1862). In
federal courts, the prosecutor "is clothed with the power and charged with the duties
of the Attorney General in England under the common law." United States v. Brokaw,
60 F. Supp. 100, 101 (S.D. IlL. 1945). In the Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454,
457 (1868), the prosecutor was held to have exclusive discretion to enter a nolle prosequi
at any time before the jury was impanelled. Rule 48a of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure now requires judicial consent to a request for nolle, but no criteria exist
for the exercise of judicial discretion in ruling on a motion to nolle, nor is the
prosecutor required to state his reasons for seeking a nolle. State prosecutors also
possess the common law powers of the Attorney General of England in the absence of
limiting statutes. See, e.g., People v. Covelli, 415 111. 79, 112 N.E.2d 156, 160 (1953).
Policy justifications also exist for the prosecutor's discretionary authority. See CRIME
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 133; K. DAVIS, supra note 7, at 188-91; PROSECtMON
AND DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 7. at 64 (Prosecution Standard § 2.5); Baker, The
Prosecutor-Initiation of Prosecution, 23 J. CRIMr. L. & C. 770 (1933); Baker, The Prose-
cuting Attorney: Legal Aspects of the Office, 26 J. CRut. L. & C. 647 (1935); Ferguson,
Formulation of Enforcement Policy: An Anatomy of the Prosecutor's Discretion Prior to
Accusation, 11 RUTGERS L. REV. 507 (1957); Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion in the
Initiation of Criminal Complaints, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 519 (1969). The courts have been
reluctant to intrude in the prosecutor's discretion except in instances of patent abuse.
It would be "sheer impertinence" and "contrary to settled judicial tradition" to do
so. Howell v. Brown, 85 F. Supp. 537, 540 (D. Neb. 1949). Chief Justice Burger, then
judge in the District of Columbia Circuit, noted:
Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the Execu-
tive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to institute criminal pro-
ceedings ... or whether to dismiss a proceeding once brought.
Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967); accord, United States
v. Boyle, 338 F. Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1971).
59. Indicative of this prosecutorial sentiment were the reactions to the two federal
pretrial diversion bills. The initial bill, S. 3309, authorized (1) both the program di-
rector and the prosecuting government attorney to recommend an eligible accused
individual to the committing officer (United States magistrate or district judge) for
pretrial diversion, and (2) the district judge to release any accused individual into
a program even when he fails to meet the eligibility criteria, if such release would
promote rehabilitation. Hearings on S. 3309, supra note 1, §§ 5 & 6(b). Prosecutors
otherwise favorable to pretrial diversion criticized the bill for allowing the court and
program director a say in the diversion decision. W. N. Seymour, Jr., former United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, testified that:
Although a judicial officer should have some role in approving the plan to defer
prosecution in order to assure against abuses, it is a mistake to change the
fundamental division of responsibility by shifting the decision on whether or not
to prosecute the case from the prosecutor to the court.
Id. at 32. See also Statement of Deputy Attorney General R. Erickson, id. at 139.
As a result, subsequent bill S. 798 defined an "eligible individual" for pretrial di-
version as one who is recommended by the government attorney. Hearings on S. 798,
supra note 1, § 3(l). Even with this change, there were reservations about possible
judicial intrusion. As one prosecutor testified, "I am still a prosecutor, and I do
not like judges fooling around with my discretion, and that is really what it is all
about." R. Leonard, id. at 406. See also Statement of J. McKevitt, Assistant Attorney
General, id. at 396.
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under prosecutorial control. In the New Haven program, for instance,
a screener's recommendation for pretrial diversion is rarely rejected
by the prosecutor. This is because the screeners deliberately select and
recommend only those accused individuals whom they expect the
prosecutor will approve. They have learned to predict prosecutorial
preferences.00
In more established programs the relation with the prosecutor may
be more adversarial. Manhattan program screeners are fairly aggressive
in advocating the pretrial diversion of eligible individuals. They often
"appeal" an assistant district attorney's rejection of a diversion recom-
mendation to his superior or to the arraignment judge. Nonetheless,
they recognize that the program's viability depends on prosecutorial
grace, and they are cautious not to often recommend eligible cases that
they anticipate the assistant prosecutors will veto.,1
C. Judges
Judicial reticence to interfere with the prosecutor's discretion ex-
tends to pretrial diversion. Standard 2.2 on diversion procedures of the
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and
Goals proposes that "the decision by the prosecutor not to divert a
particular defendant should not be subject to judicial review. 02
Amended S. 798 authorizes a United States magistrate or district judge
to release an "eligible individual" into pretrial diversion, but "eligible
individual" is defined as an accused person recommended by the
government attorney. 63
Some programs are authorized by enabling state court rules. In New
Jersey, the state supreme court must approve a program and judges
are authorized to defer criminal proceedings pending pretrial diver-
sion upon recommendation by the program administrators with consent
of the prosecutor. 4 The authority of a judge when the prosecutor de-
nies consent is not defined. Criminal procedure rules adopted by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court authorize a hearing before a judge on
a motion for pretrial diversion requested by the prosecutor or defense
counsel.00 Again, the judge is involved in the decisionmaking only
60. Freed, supra note 26, at 43. The same observation has been made of the De
Novo program in Minneapolis. Nimmer, supra note 26, at 115.
61. Interviews with Manhattan program screeners and assistant district attorneys,
April 1973.
62. STANDARDS AND GOALS REPORT, CouRTs, supra note 26, at 40.
63. Amended S. 798, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 5 8 3(l) (1973). See note 1 supra.
64. N.J. R. CRIMr. P. 3.28(a), 3.28(b); see note 21 supra.
65. PA. R. CRIM. P. 175, 178; see note 21 supra. The district attorney of the Ac-
celerated Rehabilitative Disposition program (ARD) in Philadelphia screens all ar-
rested cases and subpoenas eligible persons to appear for an informal hearing before
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after the prosecutor has selected and decided whom he will divert.06
Judicial interest and participation in pretrial diversion programs
vary in different jurisdictions but generally appear to be limited. In
some jurisdictions pretrial diversion is exclusively a matter of prose-
cutorial discretion and "[t]he only role played by the judge is in grant-
ing the motion for continuance ...or for dismissal of charges. ' 7 In
others, judges who are basically sympathetic to the idea of pretrial
diversion nonetheless feel no need to review the prosecutor's or pro-
g-ram screeners' discretionary judgments and are disinclined to assume
a more active role. 68 Judges are more knowledgeable about pretrial
diversion when a program is organized as a component of the court,
but even then they defer to the prosecutor's discretionary control.t 9
In one program most of the participants are directly referred by the
court.70 Yet upon favorable termination, the same judges refuse to
dismiss charges and grant instead summary probation after a nolo
contendere plea.71
D. Defense counsel
There are two stages in the pretrial diversion process in which par-
ticipation by defense counsel is important-at intake to assist the ac-
a special ARD judge in the Court of Common Pleas. Although defense counsel is present
at the hearing, he intervenes only after the prosecutor has made the diversion deci-
sion. Diversion at the initiative of defense counsel is infrequent. Interview with D.
Vinikoor, assistant district attorney, Philadelphia, September 1973. See Philadelphia
ARD Program: Grant Application to Governor's Justice Commission, July 1973 (Office
of the District Attorney, Philadelphia).
66. Two interests are involved in pretrial diversion: the interest of society in deter-
rence, and the interest of the accused in rehabilitation. Judicial scrutiny of the di-
version decision after the prosecutor has decided whom to divert may safeguard only
the first interest. Paradoxically, prosecutors do not seem to mind if a judge, in the
interests of deterrence, refuses to approve a diversion recommendation. However, if a
judge in the interests of rehabilitation were to order diversion over the objection of
the prosecutor, this would be denounced as improper j0dicial encroachment. So long
as the enabling court rules and proposed statutes dc- not give the judge a role in
the initial diversion decision, or do not authorize a judge to review the prosecutor's
decision, there may be no occasion for judicial safeguards of an accused's interest in
rehabilitation. However, California courts have at least indirectly shown a willingness
to protect the rehabilitative interest. See People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d 89, 473 P.2d
993, 89 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1970) (statute restricting court's power to strike from complaint
factual allegation which, if true, would change penalty, held unconstitutional as viola-
tive of California's constitutional separation of powers).
67. Testimony of W. Henschel, Hearings on S. 3309, supra note 1, at 56, regarding
the De Novo program in Minneapolis.
68. Interviews with Judges Adorno and Quinn of the New Haven Sixth Circuit Court,
March 1973.
69. Interview with Chief Judge H. Greene of the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia, February 1973. Project Crossroads began as an independent program but
later was incorporated into the social services department of the Superior Court.
70. In the California programs, no screening in the police detention cells is al-
lowed and the staff cannot recommend persons for diversion. Instead, the judge at
his discretion directly refers accused persons to the program. See ABT Report on
California Bay Area programs, supra note 13.
71. See note 129 infra.
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cused in making an informed decision, and at rearraignment or dis-
position upon unfavorable termination.
Program procedures often state that prospective participants shall
have the opportunity to consult with counsel,72 if desired, before
agreeing to pretrial diversion. 73 With some exceptions, 74 this does not
commonly occur in reality.73 Some of the underlying reasons are in-
adequate communication and misperceptions between program staff76
and defense counsel.7 7 Defense counsel is not even mentioned in
amended bill S. 798. 78
Most accused persons probably could be allocated, without disagree-
ment among criminal justice officials, into the three categories of (1)
screen-out, (2) pretrial diversion, and (3) prosecution. However, the
boundaries of the second category may be imprecisely drawn. Exercise
of discretion is greatest in cases falling in the two marginal zones, and
72. Right to counsel in criminal proceedings where the accused faces possible im-
prisonment, even on misdemeanor charges, is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Some commentators have
recommended representation by counsel at all pretrial negotiations with the prose-
cutor. Standard 2.2 of Procedure for Diversion Programs stresses "the offender's right
to be represented by counsel during negotiations for diversion and entry and approval
of the agreement." STANDARDS AND GOALS REPORT, CouRTs, supra note 26, at 39.
73. See, e.g., New Haven Pretrial Services Council, Diversion Program Statement
to Participants, 1972, supra note 54.
74. The Philadelphia ARD program and Project Crossroads, unlike other programs,
involve defense counsel. Their procedures make the presence of defense counsel nec-
essary because the diversion decision is made at a hearing at which a judge or prosecutor
presides. See notes 56 & 65 supra.
75. This is also the conclusion of Arnold Hopkins, supra note 1, and Daniel
Skoler, Director of the ABA Commission on Correctional Facilities and Services, Wash-
ington, D.C., Interview held September 1973.
Most program participants are indigent and do not have counsel at intake. If a par-
ticipant is unfavorably terminated and rearraigned on the initial charge, the court then
usually assigns counsel. But counsel at that point typically has no information re-
garding the participant's program performance. In the absence of counsel at intake,
programs submit periodic performance reports only to the prosecutor's office. The
lack of information may prejudice subsequent defense efforts. Interview with M. Lewis,
chief public defender, New Haven Sixth Circuit Court, March 1973.
76. Screeners in the New Haven and Manhattan programs expressed apprehension
that their "independent status" in the eyes of the prosecutor would be jeopardized by
close association with defense counsel. The fear that public defense counsel might
"dump" marginal cases on the program to relieve their own caseloads was another
deterrent to collaboration. Interviews in March-April 1973.
77. Public defenders and legal aid attorneys appear sympathetic but unmotivated
to intervene in the diversion decision. New Haven public defenders, for example, be-
lieved the stakes involved for program participants were small given the nature of the
charges and prior arrest records, and saw no urgent reason for intervening. Alter-
nately, when larger stakes were involved, they were reluctant to seek diversion for
the accused unless confident the accused would be favorably terminated. Otherwise,
their bargaining position would be weakened and subsequent defense efforts prejudiced.
Interviews with Messrs. M. Lewis and H. Cruse, public defenders, New Haven Sixth
Circuit Court, April 1973. Similar views were expressed by L. Stiller, public defender,
Superior Court of the District of Columbia, April 1973. Legal aid attorneys in New
Haven, in agreement with the prosecutorial view, opposed converting the diversion
decision into a quasi-adversary proceeding. Advocacy on their part was seen as threat-
ening the informal cooperation between the program and the prosecutor's office.
Interviews with Messrs. Howard Geminer and Ion Silbert, April 1973.
78. Amended S. 798, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973). See note 1 supra.
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it is to these, as well as to cases that appear to be in the second category,
that assistance of counsel should attach at the intake stage. At the
boundary between the diversion and the prosecution categories, there
are those who are willing, formally eligible, and conceivably might
benefit from pretrial diversion, but to whom the prosecutor denies
consent and insists on criminal processing. This prosecutorial decision
is not challenged or reviewed, and program staff generally avoid pos-
sible confrontations by anticipating prosecutorial response and avoid-
ing marginal cases.70
At the boundary between the diversion and the screen-out categories,
there are those formally eligible but for whom pretrial diversion may
not be in their best legal interest. Insufficient or improperly seized
evidence, triviality of charge, 0 or any of a number of grounds may
render probable an outright dismissal, a suspended sentence, or a minor
fine. Risk of unfavorable termination may also offset the benefits of
pretrial diversion.8' In these instances the accused needs assistance of
counsel to make an informed choice.
The requirement of a guilty plea or an acknowledgment of "moral
responsibility" as a prerequisite for program participation points out
the need for assistance of counsel for those in the diversion category.
At issue is the presumption of legal, not factual, innocence.8 2 An ad-
mission of guilt to a program counselor does not have the same legal
consequences as a formal guilty plea in open court. A factor in the di-
version decision should be legal guilt. If, in the judgment of defense
counsel, the accused could be found guilty, he should be recommended
for pretrial diversion assuming he is otherwise eligible and willing.
If the accused could not be found guilty regardless of his guilt or inno-
79. See Freed, supra note 26, at 43; Nimmer, supra note 26, at 112, 115.
80. One-half of all misdemeanor arrests are "essentially violations of moral norms
or instances of annoying behavior." PRESIDENT'S COmIIssIoN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTI
CRIME 10 (1967).
81. Some public defenders in the District of Columbia felt that unfavorable termina-
tion from Project Crossroads would prejudice defense efforts when prosecution is re-
instated, because there would be reduced hope of negotiating a favorable plea. In-
terview with L. Stiller, Washington D.C., April 1973. Indeed, current prosecutorial
policy is to give top priority to the prosecution of unfavorably terminated participants.
Interview with Charles Work, chief assistant United States Attorney, Washington, D.C.,
April 1973.
82. See p. 833 supra. It is important that the presumption of legal innocence
be maintained. Whether an individual participant admits to a program counselor actual
guilt or responsibility is legally inconsequential. So long as the prosecutor agrees to
treat all statements made in pretrial diversion, including the fact of participation, as
privileged material and inadmissible in evidence, there is no danger of self-incrimina-
tion. Some programs have informal agreements of this kind with the prosecutor. The
ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
PLEAS OF GUILTY § 3.4 (1967) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF
GUILTY], recommends the exclusion of all pretrial negotiations from use at subsequent
trials.
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cence in fact, he should not be recommended for pretrial diversion
unless he expressly desires it and is eligible. This procedure would
help ensure that cases which warrant dismissal do not become pretrial
diversion cases.
E. Control of discretion
Once a prosecutor consents to the establishment of a pretrial diver-
sion program, fairness and social policy would dictate that his discre-
tion to divert, unlike his discretion to prosecute prior to the establish-
ment of the program, should be subject to judicial control.
Pretrial diversion can be seen both as an exchange and as a sentenc-
ing process. As in plea bargaining there is a legitimate exchange of
tactical concessions to the mutual advantage of defense and prosecu-
tion. 3 However, instead of negotiating on a case-by-case basis, pretrial
diversion formalizes the exchange a priori and packages it for alloca-
tion on a mass basis.
But pretrial diversion constitutes more than an exchange. It is a sen-
tencing activity by nonjudicial personnel. Upon the initiative of pro-
gram staff and with the consent of the prosecutor, the accused is sen-
tenced to a term of probation before trial without effective interven-
tion of defense counsel or judge.
The almost universal hostility to pre-plea judicial intervention,
whether in plea bargaining8 4 or pretrial diversion,sa reflects a concep-
tion of both as tactical exchanges rather than as sentencing processessO
A decision to divert, however, is a functional equivalent of a sen-
tence to pretrial probation. s7 Pretrial diversion encroaches on judi-
83. In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970), plea bargaining was justified
in terms of the "mutuality of advantage" for defense and prosecution.
84. See, e.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 82, § 3.3; White,
A Proposal for the Reform of the Plea-Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 439, 452
(1971). Court decisions condemning judicial intervention are summarized in Note,
supra note 7, at 287 n.5. However, a survey of prosecutors in 30 states found that
about one-third indicated the judge was in fact involved in some phase of the plea
bargain. Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty
Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. Rav. 865, 905 (1964). See also McIntyre & Lippman, supra note
4, at 1157.
85. See pp. 839-40 supra.
86. See Note, supra note 7, at 287.
87. Pretrial diversion has been seen as "mere per se shifting of selected offenders
from one form of probationary supervision (i.e., post-conviction) to another form of the
same (i.e., pre-prosecution probation)." Leonard Statement, supra note 12, in Hearings
on S. 798, supra note 1, at 411. Amended S. 798 proposes the use of federal probation
officers for the pretrial diversion staff. Amended S. 798, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(l)(b)
(1973). See note 1 supra. Some programs are currently operated by state probation de-
partments. See Nassau County Probation Department, Operation Midway, 1973. Even
in programs operated independently of probation, it is recognized that "the majority
of the cases handled by the [pretrial diversioni project could normally be handled
through the probation unit." ABT Report on Baltimore, supra note 13, at 29.
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cial sentencing authority. Although there is no formal adjudication
of guilt before sentence, most programs tend to proceed as if the ac-
cused is guilty in fact and in need of rehabilitation. Favorable termina-
tion, therefore, preempts the duty of the judge to adjudicate and sen-
tence. It should be incumbent upon judges to claim responsibility for
the diversion decision or, at least, to oversee the discretionary deci-
sions of prosecutor and program staff.
Merely substituting decisionmakers will not protect against arbitrary
discretion. Change in pretrial diversion procedure must also be ef-
fected. There should be a hearing before a judge s if and whenever
there is disagreement among prosecutor, program staff, and defense
counsel regarding admission of borderline cases. This prediversion
hearing, modeled after a sentencing hearing, would be an open advo-
cacy proceeding. After informal argument by prosecutor and defense
counsel, and presentation of a presentence report 9 on the accused by
the program staff, the judge would rule on admission. 0 This proce-
dure would help ensure sentencing due process9' in the pretrial diver-
sion decision.
III. Social Intervention
Upon waiver of the right to speedy trial and the statute of limita-
tions, and in some instances after plea of guilty or acknowledgment of
"moral responsibility" for the charged offense, prosecution is deferred,
and the accused enters the three to 12 month pretrial diversion pro-
gram.92 It is characteristic of these programs that the staff consist pri-
88. Current programs which include a hearing give the judge only a limited role.
For example, the role of the Philadelphia ARD hearing judge, as in plea bargaining,
is limited to a superficial oral examination of the accused to ensure that his ac-
ceptance of diversion was voluntarily and intelligently made. The hearing is not a
forum for challenging the prosecutor's decision. See note 65 supra.
89. On the presentence report, see generally Note, The Presentence Report: An Era-
pirical Study of Its Use in the Federal Criminal Process, 58 Gao. L.J. 451 (1970). Pro-
grams with a two-stage screening procedure normally prepare a background report dur-
ing the interim continuance period. See p. 837 supra.
90. The same judge, of course, would not preside in the subsequent trial if the
accused is unfavorably terminated. This would be consistent with Rule 32(c) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which forbids disclosure of the presentence re-
port to the presiding judge until after the defendant has pleaded or been found guilty.
91. There has been growing concern for the procedural regularity of sentencing pro.
cedures. See Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (sentencing found to be a "critical
stage" in a criminal proceeding and right to counsel granted); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S.
448 (1962) (defendant must have notice and opportunity to be heard prior to sen-
tencing). See also Pugh & Carver, Due Process and Sentencing-From "Mapp" to
"Mempha" to "McGautha," 49 TEXAs L. REV. 25 (1970).
92. In all programs the staff may and often do request an additional continuance
of 30 to 60 days if warranted by the rehabilitative needs of the accused. See, e.g., ABT
Reports, supra note 13.
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marily of paraprofessionals, including ex-offenders, drawn from the
same community from which program participants come.93 The serv-
ices provided vary across programs but the mainstays aYe counseling
and job placement.
The objectives of counseling in pretrial diversion appear nebulous.
During the first two years of the Manhattan program, counselors and
participants often did not know what was expected of them; at one
point there were 10 different counseling plans. 94 "[D]ismissals were
being granted to participants who spent 12 weeks being quiet, obedi-
ent, and uninvolved." 95 Even today, each counselor pursues his own
counseling approach; individual and group counseling methods are
tried on and off seemingly without any guiding theory.96
Whereas Manhattan counselors are generally more analytically ori-
ented, aiming to change basic social attitudes, the New Haven and
Crossroads counselors concentrate on improving elementary social func-
tioning. 7 In most programs the weekly counseling is little more than
a "rap session." It is in effect a probationary-type of supervision and
control-though with more sympathy and attention than that pro-
vided by the average overburdened probation officer-mixed ad hoc
with some social services, vocational counseling, and personal advice
on how to cope with the exigencies of urban living.98 Regular attend-
ance is perhaps the main objective measure of good performance.99
93. One of the goals of the Manhattan program was to demonstrate that rehabilita-
tion can be operated by paraprofessional ex-offenders. Some feel that successful use of
such staff in itself justifies pretrial diversion programs. Interview with Leon Leiberg,
director of Parole Corrections Project, American Correctional Association, September
1973.
94. MANHATTAN PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 10, at 37.
95. Id.
96. In the "second round" programs, 58 percent of the participants received no group
counseling. (Programs vary greatly: In Atlanta, 86 percent were involved in group ses-
sions: in Minneapolis, 2 percent.) Overall, in the seven programs, 39 percent of par-
ticipants received in excess of 10 hours of individual counseling during the three month
diversion period.
97. The New Haven staff believe that behaviors and attitudes built up over a life-
time will not be altered by paraprofessional counseling in three months. Project Cross-
roads counselors defined their task as teaching the participant "to manipulate the
system," i.e., teaching how to ride a city bus, apply for welfare, become a knowl-
edgeable consumer, and so forth.
98. In addition to counseling and job placement, other services include informal
tutorials, formal remedial education, and referrals to outside sources for psychological,
medical, or legal assistance. In the "second round" programs, about 72 percent of par-
ticipants are male, 40 percent are white; 40 percent black (though some programs, such
as the one in Baltimore, are predominantly black), and 13 percent are Mexican-Amer-
icans; most have completed high school. Programs differ in the extent of services
provided. Thus, while Project Crossroads offers a General Education Diploma, the
Boston and San Antonio programs have no in-house remedial education and no refer-
rals to outside educational institutions even though their participants have the lowest
educational levels among the "second round" programs.
99. Repeated failure to attend counseling appointments is one of the most frequent
grounds for unfavorable termination. See note 124 infra.
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The second main rehabilitation tool is job placement. 100 Program
staff generally serve as brokers for channeling the accused to commu-
nity or state employment agencies and job training positions. 10' Job
development by the program staff itself is infrequent.
The effectiveness of social rehabilitation is difficult to assess because
of the variation from program to program and the absence of clearly
defined measurement standards. -02 It is important to keep in mind that
the delivery of social services-counseling, job placement, and remedial
education-is an immediate goal that must be distinguished from the
basic criminal justice goals of pretrial diversion-recidivism reduction,
stigma avoidance, and resource conservation. These social services are
or should be means to these other ends. Otherwise, a pretrial diversion
program would be evaluated as any other agency engaged in counsel-
ing, employment placement, or tutoring. 03
The principal justification and appeal of pretrial diversion is reduc-
tion of offender recidivism which underlies rising crime rates. 04 Most
program participants are accused of property offenses,' 0 5 and recidivism
is generally more prevalent among those arrested for property offenses
than for crimes of violence.' 06
Rearrest rates for favorably terminated participants over a period
100. When participants are mostly school-age youth, as in the Baltimore program,
the rehabilitation emphasis is on counseling rather than job placement.
101. In the "second round" programs, 57 percent of the participants needing em-
ployment were placed and 29 percent dropped their new jobs before completion of
their diversion tenure.
102. Ideally, the criterion of effectiveness might be the degree of correlation be-
tween individual needs and characteristics on the one hand, and different rehabili-
tation alternatives on the other. However, very little is yet known about how dif-
ferent kinds of individuals respond to different kinds of correctional treatment. See
CRIME COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 141. Some forms of rehabilitation, such
as individual and group counseling, involve subjective judgments, and uniform
standards for evaluating their effectiveness are as yet unavailable.
103. There is a tendency for program staff to become so engrossed in the delivery
of social services that the distinction between immediate and ultimate goals is blurred.
One program administrator stated that "the ultimate goals of the project include as-
sisting those accepted in finding stabilized and productive employment." Berger, The
New Haven Pretrial Diversion Program: A Preliminary Report, December 31, 1972, at
2 (unpublished memorandum, New Haven Pretrial Services Council).
104. Public endorsements of pretrial diversion invariably make this claim. See note
2 supra. S. REP. No. 417 accompanying amended S. 798 states:
The real benefit of pretrial diversion is the final result: The individual who has
completed a program of pretrial diversion is much less likely to commit another
crime than the individual who goes through the criminal justice system in the
normal way.
S. REP. No. 417, supra note 1, at 7.
105. See note 31 supra.
106. See D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 41-44 (1964).
Research of criminal careers shows a 90 percent probability that an individual
convicted of larceny, auto theft, burglary, or robbery, will be rearrested for one of
these four offenses. Blumstein & Larsen, Models of a Total Criminal Justice System,
17 OPERATIONS RESEARCH 224 (1969). Former United States Attorney IV. N. Seymour,
Jr., noted that "recidivism is least likely to occur among persons guilty of at least
certain forms of violent crime." Hearings on S. 3309, supra note 1, at 32.
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of three to 12 months range from between one and three percent in
some programs, to an average 10 percent in the "second round" pro-
grams, 07 and 15.8 and 22.2 percent in the Manhattan and Crossroads
programs.' 08 In support of pretrial diversion, these figures are fre-
quently compared with the much higher recidivism rates of those con-
victed and sentenced to probation or jail.1 9 However, since different
populations are compared, these differences are not very meaning-
ful.110
In the absence of control groups no conclusions can be drawn about
the effectiveness of pretrial diversion in reducing recidivism. Only
the Manhattan and Crossroads programs have employed matched con-
trols. The control groups showed a recidivism rate of 31.9 and 45.7
percent, respectively, or about twice that of favorably terminated par-
ticipants."' Aside from the methodological invalidity of these control
groups, 1 2 even if it is assumed that program participation reduces
recidivism, it is not known what element or elements of the total pro-
gram package produced the effect.1 3 Until there are data from experi-
107. Recidivism data for different programs are summarized in Hearings on S.
798, supra note 1, at 385.
108. MANHATrAN PROCRAMi REPORT, supra note 10, at 47 (over a period of 12 months);
PROjECr CROSSROADs REPORT, supra note 11, at 35 (over a period of 15 months).
109. For example, Senator Burdick estimated about two-thirds of all those prosecuted
and convicted are rearrested. Hearings on S. 798, supra note 1, at 389.
110. Those sentenced are more serious and higher risk cases than those diverted
before trial, so it is not surprising that the former population manifests a higher
recidivism rate. A more meaningful comparison would be between those diverted and
those informally screened-out before trial, since these two populations are more alike.
Indeed, since property offenders are generally known to have high recidivism rates, a
claimed recidivism rate of one or three percent thxes credulity. Planned, social in-
terventions simply are not that effective. These programs must be unusually suc-
cessful or they are selecting such low-risk participants that recidivism is unlikely even
without pretrial diversion.
111. MANHATrAN PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 10, at 47; PROJECT CROssROADS REPORT,
supra note I I, at 35.
112. "Control" groups in the Manhattan and Crossroads programs consisted of those
who underwent normal criminal processing a few weeks prior to the start of the pro-
grams and who would have been eligible for pretrial diversion under the formal
eligibility criteria had the programs been in operation at that time. They were matched
by age, offense charged, and residence with a nonrandom sample of favorably terminated
participants. These "controls" cannot be compared with the diverted sample because
the former, unlike the latter, did not undergo screening interviews by the program staff.
Because diverted participants are deliberately screened for potential program success,
they, are noncomparable with the controls. This kind of deliberate selection process is
common in all programs. The Citizens Probationary Authority concedes, for example,
that it is "highly selective" and admits only "persons for whom the probability of re-
cidivism is low." Hearings on S. 798, supra note 1, at 445. Unless there is random as-
signment of eligible candidates to control and diversion conditions, any observed dif-
ferences in recidivism rate may be explained either by a genuine effect of program
participation or by the artifact of sample selection.
113. The lower recidivism rate of favorably terminated participants compared to
controls-assuming no differences in initial selectivity between the two groups-may be
due to (1) the rehabilitative services, (2) the avoidance of the trauma of prosecution
and criminal stigmatization, or (3) the interaction of both factors. If the first factor is
principally responsible for reduced recidivism, then it would not matter if the re-
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ments with random assignment of individuals to different comparison
conditions,114 the claim of recidivism reduction remains an article of
faith.
The avoidance of stigmatization from criminal processing by chan-
neling the accused into rehabilitation is another rationale for pretrial
diversion. 1 5 For a first offender or middle class professional, the social
consequences of a criminal sanction-social ostracism and possible
foreclosure of economic opportunities-are very real.1 6 However, few
habilitative services were provided before or after trial. It would be interesting to com-
pare recidivism rates between pretrial diversion programs and experimental probation
or correctional programs (which have highly motivated corrections officers, low case-
loads, and facilities and services equal to those of pretrial diversion programs). For
an overview of some of these experimental approaches, see STANDARDS AND GOALS RE-
PORT, CORRECTIONS, supra note 1, at 221-46, 311-40. If the second factor produces the
effect, the full panoply of rehabilitative services need not be delivered at all, at least
to some participants.





(I) pretrial (2) experimental
Delivery of Yes diversion probation
Social
Services No (3) informal (4) traditional
screening-out probation
Present evaluation studies, their methodological shortcomings aside, have compared re-
cidivism rates between groups 1 (low rate) and 4 (high rate). To use the logic of
analysis of variance, these studies have examined only the "interaction effect" between
the factors of rehabilitative services and avoidance of prosecution. They have neglected
to examine the "main (column) effect" of avoidance of prosecution (comparing,
specifically, the recidivism rates of groups 1 and 2), and the "main (row) effect" of
rehabilitative services (comparing, specifically, the recidivism rates of groups 1 and 3).
These proposed "main effect" comparisons could help pinpoint what, if anything, makes
pretrial diversion effective in reducing recidivism, and how a program may be stream-
lined to attain that goal more efficiently.
114. The directors of the New Haven, Crossroads, and Manhattan programs ex-
pressed, in interviews, strong moral and legal objections to the random assignment of
eligible accused persons to experimental (pretrial diversion) and control groups. With-
out delving into the ethical and legal problems of social experimentation, certain facts
should be kept in mind: (1) Pretrial diversion programs do not have an overburdened
caseload and they process a very small fraction of a jurisdiction's pool of accused
offenders, see note 51 supra. (2) Under current screening procedures, considerable
randomness and arbitrariness already exist, e.g., not screening persons arrested on week-
ends or during certain weekday hours, see note 53 supra. Explicit randomness may
be no more undesirable than randomness from carelessness or arbitrary discretion that
deprives eligible persons of the opportunity for pretrial diversion. (3) Similar ex-
perimentation in other areas of corrections has been proposed and carried out, see
CRIME'CoMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 260.
115. For studies in stigmatization, see DEVIANCE: STUDIES IN THE PROCESS OF STIGMA-
TIZATION AND SOCIETAL REACTION (S. Dinitz ed. 1969).
116. For lower or working class persons, a criminal sanction may have only limited
social consequences. A British study found that for the common nonhabitual offender,
typically poor, unskilled, and unemployed, "the [social] impact of conviction is di-
rectly related to the quality of life that went before," and "for many, stigma was at
most a minor difficulty compared with the problem of getting a living at all." See
J. MARTIN & D. WEBSTER, THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION 203, 204 (1971).
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programs admit accused first offenders exclusively; many have a size-
able minority with prior convictions. For the accused already stigma-
tized, formal diversion into rehabilitation need not be confined to
the pretrial stage.117
Comparison of per capita costs of pretrial diversion"" and of incar-
ceration"19 and probation is often made to support claims of saved
costs and efficient use of scarce judicial resources. Although the for-
mer costs less the comparison is misleading. Most pretrial diversion
participants, if they had not been diverted, probably would not have
been sentenced to prison. 20 Probation, in contrast to pretrial diver-
sion, is claimed to be a less effective rehabilitation process. The dif-
ference, if true, could be explained by unequal resources: Pretrial
117. The scope of this Note is confined to pretrial diversion. However, diversion
could and sometimes does occur after trial, though different appellations are then used.
Statutes in some states provide for probation without conviction. See, e.g., MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 641 (Supp. 1973). Deferred sentencing statutes may also stay imposition
of sentence pending a probationary period which, if satisfactorily completed, leads to a
reduced or suspended sentence. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN, § 609.135 (1973).
A unique program that combines pre- and posttrial diversion features is Operation
Midway of the Nassau County Probation Department. It admits primarily those
charged with serious felonies. Unlike other pretrial programs, the district attorney
plays a passive role in the screening process; he seldom vetoes a diversion recommen-
dation. However, favorable termination does not preclude prosecution; in fact, most of
the serious cases are prosecuted. Favorable termination then becomes a bargaining
lever for a reduced or suspended sentence after conviction. This procedure is inter-
esting in several respects. It enables one accused of a serious offense to receive pre-
trial rehabilitative services while the prosecutor retains full discretion to prosecute.
The onus of punishment is reduced, though not the stigma of conviction, and thus
defense counsel is moved to participate actively because the stakes involved for the
accused felons are high. Cohen. Project Operation Midway, 1972; Nassau County Pro-
bation Department, supra note 87.
118. Per capita costs in the New Haven program are $691; Manhattan program,
$731 for favorably terminated participants ($1,518 for favorably and unfavorably ter-
minated participants combined); Project Crossroads, $506. See respectively, Freed, supra
note 26, at 68; MANHATTAN PROGRAMi REPORT, supra note 10, at 50; J. HOLOHAN, REPORT
OF A BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF PROJECT CROSSROADS 10 (1971).
119. National average per capita costs of incarceration per year during 1965 were
$3,613 for juveniles, $1,966 for adult felons, and $1,046 for adult misdemeanants.
CRIME COMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 161.
Indeed, if cost-savings is a main goal, the diversion exit point should be pushed
back to the police stationhouse. The breakdown of costs among different criminal
justice agencies for processing an accused (averaged across all categories of offenses)
is as follows: 67 percent to police costs; 20 percent to corrections; 11 percent tojuvenile agencies; and 2 percent to the courts. PRESIDENT'S COMIMISSION ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUsTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 6 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COURTS REPORT]. Lodging pretrial diversion programs
in the court arraignment stage results in savings to that component of the criminal
justice system which already bears proportionately the smallest burden.
120. This observation is based only on data from a preliminary study and impres-
sions of criminal justice officials. See p. 851 infra; cf. Skolnick, Social Control in
the Adversary Systen, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 52 (1967). No evidence to the
contrary has been found. Even if an eligible accused were prosecuted and convicted
rather than diverted, it would be unusual if the jail sentence were as long as three
months, the length of a pretrial diversion period. Interview with Paul Foti, Chief
Prosecutor, New Haven Sixth Circuit Court.
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diversion costs three times as much per capita as probation 1 and
pretrial diversion staff have one-third the caseload of probation
officers. 122
It remains to be shown that court congestion is appreciably allevi-
ated, and scarce resources conserved, by current pretrial diversion pro-
grams. At the present time one could infer that the system caseload
remains unaltered but one more agency, with its own substantial
budget, has been added to its processing.123
IV. Termination Decision
Participants who fail to meet program obligations are unfavorably
terminated and returned for possible prosecution on the original ar-
rest charge either during or at the end of the pretrial diversion period.
Those who perform satisfactorily are favorably terminated and recom-
mended to the prosecutor for dismissal of charges.
In contrast to the detailed entry criteria there are no comparable
standards defining satisfactory performance. In practice, the principal
basis for unfavorable terminations in New Haven is "lack of coopera-
tive attitude" demonstrated by the accused's absence from counseling
sessions. 124 In the "second round" programs, 60 percent of unfavorable
terminations were based upon "chronic lack of cooperation" and
"abscondance." These factors seem more important than rearrest. In
many programs rearrest during the pretrial diversion period does not
lead to automatic expulsion. One-third of rearrested participants in
the "second round" programs were not expelled; in fact most of them
later received recommendations that charges be dismissed.
About two-thirds of the participants in the Manhattan, Crossroads,
and New Haven programs are favorably terminated. 25 They tend to
1
121. Average per capita cost of probation for an adult felony offender in 1965
was $200. PRESIDENT'S COURTS REPORT, supra note 119, at 15. The cost of diversion
is discussed in note 118 supra.
122. About three-fourths of all misdemeanants on probation are supervised by pro-
bation officers with a caseload of over 100. The recommended ideal caseload per
probation officer is 35. CRIME COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 167. The case-
load per counselor in the Manhattan program ranges from 18 to 30 and in Project
Crossroads from 25 to 30. Interview with E. Olgiatti, supra note 35; Interview with
J. Davis, supra note 30.
123. Pretrial diversion might be an effective device for reducing pretrial detention.
It offers indigents accused of minor offenses who are unable to post bond an al-
ternative to jail pending arraignment or trial. No data are available on the effect
on pretrial detention.
124. Freed, supra note 26, at 72. Programs usually give participants every benefit
of the doubt. It takes repeated absences before an unfavorable termination is issued.
125. In the "second round" programs, the favorable terminations ranged from 34
to 84 percent, with an average of 76 percent. Such figures are not very meaningful
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be older, white, more educated, and female. 120 Dismissal of charges
against the favorably terminated appears to depend in part on the
prosecutor's control over intake. If he consents to the pretrial diver-
sion of only those he does not intend to prosecute fully, it is likely
he will also consent to the dismissal recommendation1 27 Conversely,
if the prosecutor diverts those he would have prosecuted but for the
program's intervention, it is less likely that he would routinely agree
to dismissal recommendations. 2 From the prosecutor's viewpoint, he
can assert control over the pretrial diversion process either at intake
or at disposition. In the New Haven, Crossroads, and Manhattan pro-
grams, almost all of the favorably terminated receive dismissals. In the
California programs, only one-third are favorably terminated and many
of these are nonetheless returned for criminal processing.129
The unfavorably terminated are returned for prosecution pre-
sumably without prejudice. 130 Court records of the unfavorably ter-
minated in New Haven show that none went to trial. One-third had
their cases nolle prossed and the rest received minor fines or suspended
sentences upon a plea of guilty."'2 During the first two years of Project
Crossroads, one-half of the unfavorably terminated nonetheless had
their charges dismissed." 32 Thus, it appears that at least some of the
in the absence of standards defining satisfactory performance. The favorable termina-
tion rate can be artificially raised or lowered simply by admitting more lower or
higher risk participants.
126. Freed, supra note 26, at 74. These characteristics associated with "good risk"
have also been found to be reliable predictors of favorable termination in the
Manhattan program. Interview with Franklin Zimring, Professor of Law, University of
Chicago Law School, and consultant to the Manhattan program, May 1973.
127. The New Haven program has an informal understanding with the prosecutor
that the latter will consent to pretrial diversion of only those accused persons whose
charges will definitely be dropped upon favorable termination. Interview with Mark
Berger, former Director, New Haven Pretrial Services Council, February 1973.
128. See description of Operation Midway, supra note 117.
129. In the California programs the staff can only report the participant's per-
formance to the prosecutor and cannot make any disposition recommendation. Fa-
vorably terminated participants enter a nolo contendere plea and receive summary
probation (10 days in San Jose, 30 days to one year in Santa Rosa) at the end of
which, upon motion, the case may be dismissed and the record expunged at the
court's discretion. Many favorably terminated participants in fact never get their record
expunged. ABT Report on Project Intercept (California Bay Area programs), supra
note 13, at 1-12, 11-44.
130. Public defenders interviewed in New Haven and the District of Columbia felt
that unfavorable termination would be prejudicial to defense efforts in the subse-
quent prosecution and sentencing stages. They believed it was in the best defense
interests of an accused not to enter pretrial diversion if the chances were high that
he might be unfavorably terminated. Interviews with Messrs. H. Geminer, M. Lewis,
H. Cruse, and L. Stiller, March-April 1973.
131. Freed, supra note 26, at 76.
132. Testimony of J. Trotter, former assistant director of Project Crossroads, in
Hearings on S. 3309, supra note 1, at 111. At present, however, all unfavorably
terminated participants from Project Crossroads are given priority in prosecution. In-
terview with C. Work, supra note 81.
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accused in pretrial diversion would have been screened-out of the
criminal process anyway in the absence of these programs.
Fairness would seem to require some procedural safeguards when a
participant is unfavorably terminated and returned for prosecution.
Programs normally terminate by issuing written notice to participant
and prosecutor. 133 Since pretrial diversion might be viewed as proba-
tion before trial, the requirement of a hearing before probation re-
vocation would seem applicable to diversion. 134 However, the full
panoply of procedural due process rights is not necessary. Unlike the
probationer who faces imprisonment, the pretrial diversion participant
faces only prosecution and the possibility of imprisonment. A simple
factual hearing at which the participant could present his case to the
program director and possibly be given another chance-with informal
evidentiary procedures and without counsel' 33-would afford suffi-
cient protection.
Conclusion
The idea of pretrial diversion is appealing. It represents an attempt
to structure and make visible the informal prosecutorial practices of
noncriminal disposition. It also makes possible the early delivery of
rehabilitation services on a formal rather than impromptu basis. And
it offers the prosecution an alternative to its standard options of full
criminal processing or informal screening-out without follow-up super-
vision.
However, unresolved doubts remain about other aspects of the con-
cept, its practice, and program organization. First, some observers be-
lieve that pretrial diversion is bringing about "an ideological shift"'136
133. Unfavorably terminated participants normally do not have an opportunity to
consult with counsel until rearraignment for prosecution on the initial charge.
134. In Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933
(1971), the court held that due process required a hearing before revocation of pro-
bation. The probationer's loss of freedom was found to outweigh "governmental in-
terest in summary adjudication" and "the added state burden of providing a limited
hearing." 430 F.2d at 104. But see Standard 2.2, Procedure for Diversion Programs,
which relies on the prosecutor's discretion to treat the unfavorably terminated par-
ticipant fairly, and dismisses the need for a hearing before reinstatement of prosecu-
tion. STANDARDS AND GOALS REPORT, CouRTs, supra note 26, at 39.
135. Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), held the Sixth Amendment required
appointment of counsel in a state hearing revoking probation and imposing sentence
because substantial rights were affected. In pretrial diversion the unfavorably terminated
participant will have an opportunity for counsel at rearraignment on the original
charge, and any further challenges to the termination could be raised at that time.
Programs should, however, send participant progress reports to defense counsel as well
as to the prosecutor.
136. Hopkins Interview, supra note 1.
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or "change in attitudes"137 among criminal justice officials from an
emphasis on deterrence to one on rehabilitation. Data have yet to be
collected to show whether any changes in outlook among prosecutors
have produced any real changes in their decisionmaking. Programs
may operate merely as outlets for preexisting dispositional tendencies.
In terms of the three-category scale of prosecutability, it is incumbent
upon the programs to show that the participants are recruited from
the second (diversion) category, and not from the first (screen-out) or
third (prosecution) categories. At present, the risk to public safety by
the diversion of those who should be prosecuted is minimal; but the
risk to program viability by the diversion of those who should be
screened-out is great.
Second, present discourse on the benefits of pretrial diversion is
politicized and value-laden with empirically unsubstantiated asser-
tions. The claim of recidivism reduction needs to be tested by meth-
odologically proper evaluation research. The claim of resource con-
servation is unconvincing. Other claimed benefits-stigma avoidance,
decriminalization of certain offenses, reduction of pretrial detention-
are plausible but unconfirmed.
Third, assuming that participants are drawn from the middle cate-
gory of the prosecutability scale, and that programs achieve some of
their stated goals, there remains the question whether current program
procedures may infringe upon constitutional rights of the accused.
Pretrial diversion in practice consists of discretionary judgments by
prosecutors and program staff. Their intentions and good faith may
be of the highest order, but that affords little comfort to traditions of
due process. Without judicial and defense counsel intervention in the
diversion decision to safeguard against potential abuses of discretion,
there is the danger that the results of pretrial diversion-like those of
the juvenile court which itself began as a diversion mechanism-may
be found not to justify the risks taken with basic constitutional guar-
antees.138
Pretrial diversion, which began six years ago with two pilot pro-
grams, has become today a reform movement "well on its way to insti-
tutionalization."'139 It is predicted that by 1987 there will be 150 pro-
137. Interview with Raymond Nimmer, research attorney, American Bar Foundation,
September 1973.
138. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
139. Zaloom, in 4 CRIM. JusTicE NEWSLETr , October 15, 1973, at 4. The question
whether pretrial diversion programs should be established, which depends upon whether
they are found effective in attaining their purported objectives, should be distinguished
from the question of where they should be established or lodged in the criminal
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grams diverting annually 150,000 persons before trial.140 But continued
proliferation of pretrial diversion programs at this time is hard to
justify. Existing programs must first meet the burden of showing that
their promises have been or could be delivered. Otherwise, the practice
of pretrial diversion, like "almost everything we do in the criminal
field, is on the basis of faith."'141
justice system, e.g., police stationhouse, court, or probation department. A "total sys-
tems planning" approach must also consider their relation to other on-going reforms-
e.g., speedy trial or bail reforms-in the criminal justice process. For a description and
critique of the present piecemeal approach, see Note, supra note 24.
140. Summary address by Daniel Skoler to the National Conference on Pretrial In-
tervention, Atlanta, September 21, 1973 (unpublished); see note 22 supra.
141. Vorenberg & Vorenberg, supra note 26, at 8.
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